Don Alejandro

Es política de esta bitácora el no comentar nada en lo relativo a aspectos personales. Para lo que se propone - o proponía viendo el ritmo de actualizaciones - es innecesario relatar detalles que no afectan en lo más mínimo al contenido de las entradas. Sin embargo, hoy es una gran excepción.

Ayer falleció uno de los más ilustres publicistas españoles: Don Alejandro J. Rodríguez Carrión. Catedrático desde 1982 en la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de Málaga, fue uno de los referentes más importantes de la disciplina en lengua castellana. Siempre mordaz e ingenioso, fue uno de los mejores profesores de aquella facultad. Como a muchas otras personas, tuve la suerte de que me diera clases, no todo un curso pero si lo suficiente como para disfrutar de sus ocurrencias y de su deseo por enseñar y de transmitir su pasión por la disciplina. Hacía simple algo que en otras manos sería catastrófico. A él le agradezco una cosa: si no me lo hubiera encontrado no estaría donde me encuentro ahora. Él hizo que abriera los ojos ante una carrera que había desconocido totalmente, hizo que estudiar la carrera de derecho tuviera sentido, pues era el primer paso hacia algo fascinante y en completo cambio. Obviamente, no todo han sido luces, pero en una circunstancia como ésta es un sinsentido.

Este es mi pequeño homenaje a él.

The ICJ advisory jurisdiction: the "wall" case

 

The advisory jurisdiction is different from the contentious. The most relevant difference is that the Court – any - does not have to solve a problem between two parties. It has to give on opinion about a question. Nonetheless, it has been an option which has had more success in the international legal order.  The application of the advisory function has encountered more problems in the national sphere, the own nature of what is the function of the courts has impede its proper implementation[1]. But a reflection of those difficulties can be traced back in the ICJ. Despite using the advisory function, the Court has used the procedure rules of the contentious process, maintaining the jurisdictional nature of the Tribunal[2]. This can be showed in article 68 of the Court’s statute:

“In the exercise of its advisory functions the Court shall further be guided by the provisions of the present Statute which apply in contentious cases to the extent to which it recognizes them to be applicable”.

But the own particularity of the international legal framework has allowed its development and, because of the Court, it has had an important impact. This is done in a two-step process. The first thing judges have to see is if they have jurisdiction for hearing the case and then, if that is the case, they have to analyze if there are not compelling reasons to not giving the opinion.

The two relevant articles are article 96 of the UN Charter, which allows the General Assembly or the Security Council to request an advisory opinion on any legal question, and to other organs of UN and specialized agencies only if this arise within the scope of their activities, and article 65.1 of the Statute which says that the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

The purpose of this assignment is to analyze the application of that jurisdiction, paying more attention to the legal nature of the question, in respect with the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory[3] case.

 

2. JURISDICTION

 

In order to give an opinion the Court has to see if there is jurisdiction. There are two requisites: rationae personae, that is, that the organ who requested the opinion was competent to do so and rationae materiae, which means that the judicial organ can only answer those questions of legal character[4].

 

2.1. Rationae Personae

 

The General Assembly, which was the organ who requested the advisory opinion of the Court in Resolution ES-10/13, had the competence to ask for an opinion in the Wall case. As the ICJ stated in the Legality of the Threat or Use Nuclear Weapons case “the General Assembly has competence in any event to seize the Court. Indeed, Article 10 of the Charter has conferred upon the General Assembly a competence relating to ‘any questions or any matters’ within the scope of the Charter”[5]. The Court would repeat the same in the Wall case, namely, that the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory was considered a threat to international peace and security, which is part of the General Assembly’s functions according to article 11 of the Charter[6]. The Court also concluded, despite the contentions, that it did not exceed its competence because of requiring an opinion and in spite of the fact that the Security Council was also treating the issue[7].

 

2.2. Rationae Materiae

 

Maybe the organ who submitted the question had the competence to do so, but the Court can only answer legal questions otherwise it will not have jurisdiction. It was expressly stated in Certain Expenses case that if “a question is not a legal one, the Court has no discretion in the matter; it must decline to give the opinion requested”[8]. But the terms alone does not help to comprehend what is a legal question. According to Visscher is about any problem susceptible of receive an answer based in law[9], but let’s observe how the Court has treated the matter and in the Wall case.

 

2.2.1 Any legal question?

 

The Court will answer any legal question within the realm of International Law. That is a limitation in accordance with the limits of the system[10].

 

2.2.2 Only Law?

 

As we can observe, the expression any legal question can be interpreted in the sense that excludes any legal question entangled with facts. The problem was solved in the Namibia case. The Court established that “the contingency that there may be factual issues underlying the question posed does not alter its character as a ‘legal question’”[11]. So there is no need for a pure legal one[12].

 

2.2.3 The Abstract Nature of the Question

 

Due to the different nature of the advisory procedure, the Court has answered any type of question it did not matter if it was an abstract one or related to a factual situation[13]. This was one of the issues raised by Israel objecting the Court’s jurisdiction, which rejected it stating its own jurisprudence. The Court said that “to contend that it should not deal with a question couched in abstract terms is a ‘mere affirmation devoid of any justification’ and that ‘the Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question, abstract or otherwise’”[14].

 

2.2.4 A Political Question

 

Another recurrent argument used by States against the Court’s jurisdiction is that the question posed is political, not a legal one and, therefore, the Court cannot treat it. As a jurisdictional organ and according to its statute can only solve those problems limited in the legal sphere. However, the Court has never rejected a request on these grounds. Quite the contrary, it expressed that “as, in the nature of things, is the case with so many questions which arise in international life, does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a ‘legal question’ and to ‘deprive the Court of a competence expressly conferred on it by its Statute’”[15]. “Whatever its political aspects, the Court cannot refuse to admit the legal character of a question which invites it to discharge an essentially judicial task (…) an assessment of the legality of the possible conduct of States with regard to the obligations imposed upon them by International Law”[16]. This would be the constant attitude of the Court about these allegations, including in the Wall.

We can say then that the Court “regards all questions submitted to it as ‘legal’ regardless of their political implications as long as the requested question can be answered by the application of legal rules”[17].

 

2.2.5 The Clarity of the Question

 

Another requirement about the legal question is that it has to be drafted with enough clarity. Article 65.2 of the Statute clearly states that the written request must contain an exact statement (en términos precisos in spanish) of the question. That is why one of the reasons laid down against the jurisdiction of the Court was as regards the lack of clarity thereof. Despite that the Court rejected the argument[18]. It has been a normal pattern of the jurisdictional organ to reformulate or to ascertain the relevant legal question. Despite the request being, in Judge Kooijmans’ words, “phrased in a way which can be called odd, to put it mildly”[19] there was no reason to dismiss the request in these grounds.

 

We can observe, therefore, that the Court applied correctly the requirements for having jurisdiction. The arguments against it were not strong enough in the light of the previous jurisprudence.

 

3. PROPRIETY REASONS

 

In the Court’s own words:

“When seized of a request for an advisory opinion, the Court must first consider whether it has jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and whether, should the answer be affirmative, there is any reason why it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction”[20].

That means that after analyzing its own jurisdiction the Court maybe has found that it has it, but that does not mean that there will be automatically a discussion of the request. As article 65.1 points out, the Court may give an opinion, so it leaves up to the organ whether to render a decision or not. Since saying in 1950, in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, that “Article 65.2 of the Statute is permissive. It gives the Court the power to examine whether the circumstances of the case are of such character as should lead it to decline to answer the request”[21], the Court has maintained the same approach.

As a result, the Court has argued that, because of its “responsibilities as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (Article 92 of the Charter), the Court should in principle not decline to give an advisory opinion. Only due to compelling reasons could the Court disregard a request[22]. More difficult is to ascertain what those reasons are by which the Court would decide not to render an opinion because until now it has never rejected one. That has not stopped the Court to explain when would that occurred and to States to convince the jurisdictional organ not to continue.

 

3.1 The consent of the parties with regards to an advisory opinion related with the controversy

 

In order to explain it is unavoidable to refer to the Eastern Carelia case, where the PCIJ refused to give an advisory opinion. The relevant paragraph is the following:

“It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement”[23].

States have relied on that paragraph in order to avoid an opinion of the Courts for matter related to disputes between States. The clearest example is the Western Sahara case, and similar to the Wall case. Spain argued that because the Court would give its opinion about an issue that was contentious between Morocco, Mauritania and Spanish itself and because it did not consent to the Court hearing the case. The ICJ would reject the argument stating, quoting the Peace Treaties case that:

“The consent of States, parties to a dispute, is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction in contentious cases. The situation is different in regard to advisory proceedings even where the Request for an Opinion relates to a legal question actually pending between States. The Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no binding force. It follows that no State, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, can prevent the giving of an Advisory Opinion which the United Nations considers to be desirable in order to obtain enlightenment as to the course of action it should take. The Court's Opinion is given not to the States, but to the organ which is entitled to request it”[24].

And that the lack of consent could in some circumstances “constitute a ground for declining to give the opinion requested if, in the circumstances of a given case, considerations of judicial propriety should oblige the Court to refuse an opinion”, especially when the effect would be the circumventing of the consent of the State[25].

Based on that, the Court would reject Israel’s contention, considering that the judicial organ should assistance the General Assembly and that it was not circumventing Israel’s consent. But we could add that here the problem was also that the issue was not between two States, because Palestine is still not one, and therefore not a subject of International Law which would mean that there is a contentious issue as such, due to Palestine’s lack of subjectivity[26].

 

3.2 Lack of Information

 

In this case, the Court might not render an opinion because of the lack of information, which would impede to have all the facts and thus would lead to an invalid decision. This requirement is a subjective one; there is no standard definition that can help to dilucidate if there is enough information. Moreover, this has to be linked with the principle of equality. Because if all parties are not hear that would mean that the Court would only decide by the facts and arguments presented by one party.

This was an important factor in the Wall case. Israel, due to its refusal to collaborate, did not participate in the merits of the case. That is why it was argued that the Court should not continue, it would not have listened to all the parties. As with many other issues raised against the proceedings, the Court rejected it. It considered that it had enough information[27]. Judge Buergenthal was the only judge who considered that there was not enough information. He stated that the lack of information vitiated the Court’s findings on the merits[28].

This can be one of the most debatable issues of the case. We need to bear in mind that if one of the parties do not collaborate or do not participate on the process that would lead to a not very legitimate solution[29]. The fact that all the judges except one supported giving an advisory opinion and thus considering that there was enough information could have helped to avoid the undesirable consequence of having an opinion with a lack of legitimacy.

 

3.3. Usefulness

 

The function of the Court, through the advisory opinions, has been to guide the UN organs in several matters, to clarify a situation in order to take action. That is why it was argued that the Court should not discuss the merits because the General Assembly had already declared that the Wall was illegal and as a result there was no need for assistance. This was rejected on the grounds that it was up to the General Assembly to decide what to do with the findings; it was not the Court’s role to decide that[30]. This reasoning is also a debatable one. If we analyze to past opinions we can observe that the organ which requested the opinion did not prejudice beforehand the merits of the case. A clear example is the Certain Expenses case where the General Assembly requested the opinion of the Court about what was consider part of the budget according to article 17.2; it did not say what the interpretation of the precept was. It left it to the Court. Accordingly, it can be argued that it undermines the reasoning if the organ has decided beforehand about the issue.

 

3.4. Political Influence

 

Another argument usually used in order to convince the Court that it should its discretionary power and not rendering an opinion is that it released would impede a political solution; it would interfere with the discussions between the actors. In our case, the Court decided that it was not sufficient. It considered that because of the divergent views of the actors about the opinion it was not possible to really appreciate the impact of it[31].

 

4. CONCLUSION

 

Using Falk’s words we can say, with regards to jurisdiction, that “the advisory opinion seems on extremely solid ground, relying on past patterns of practice and widely accepted views of the institutional role of the ICJ within the United Nations system”[32]. Another conclusion is that the supposedly unfettered discretion of the Court deciding to render an opinion is not that clear. Article 65 is “significantly offset by other Charter articles that oblige the organs of the United Nations to cooperate with each other”[33].

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[1] C.D. Esposito, La jurisdicción consultiva de la Corte Internacional de Justicia, at xxvii-xxx (1996).

[2] Id. 103 et seq.

[3] Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 2004, at 136 (hereinafter Wall).

[4] M.M. Aljaghoub, The Advisory Function of the International Court of Justice 1946-2005, at 38 et seq. (2006); and Application for Review of Judgement No. 273 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1982, 333-334.

[5] Legality of the Threat or Use Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep., 1996, at 22.

[6] Wall, 145.

[7] Ibid. 148-150.

[8] Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1962, at 155.

[9] C. de Visscher, Teorías y realidades en Derecho Internacional Público 387 (1962).

[10] Esposito, 82 and note 90.

[11] Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, at 27.

[12] I. Scobbie, “Issues of competence and procedure in the Wall advisory opinion” available at COMPLETE, at 13.

[13] See Esposito, 89-91 and  Aljaghoub, 61-63.

[14] Wall, 154.

[15] Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1973, at 172.

[16] Legality of the Threat or Use Nuclear Weapons, 234.

[17] Aljaghoub, 59.

[18] Wall, 153-154.

[19] COMPLETE

[20] Wall, 144.

[21] Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1950, at 72.

[22] Wall, 44 and the jurisprudence cited.

[23] COMPLETE

[24] Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1975, at 24.

[25] Ibid., 25.

[26] Scobbie, at 9.

[27] Wall, 160-162.

[28] Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, COMPLETE.

[29] Esposito, 100.

[30] Wall, 162-163.

[31] Ibid., 159-160.

[32] R.A. Falk, “Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s Security Wall”, 99 AJIL 42, at 44 (2005).

[33] Aljaghoub, 67.

Is there (already) a right to democracy in international law? The case for the West

Democracy is a polysemous idea with a multifaceted contour; a powerful word which elicits heated discussions. Similar to self-determination, it has evolved from being a philosophical and political concept to also being a juridical one. Despite its elusiveness – what is in reality a good democracy? – it has been incorporated in the most relevant legal documents. The Spanish Constitution, for instance, states in article 1.1 that Spain is a “Estado social y democrático de Derecho”[1]. Similar references can be found in other texts, which reflect the evolving character of law as a social construction. This development is, however, circumscribed to the national sphere; the situation of democracy in the international legal order diverges completely. One main feature of international law is its liberalism, inextricably linked with the notion of sovereignty. Traditionally, states are not compelled to be ordained in a specific political system; it is a free choice. As the ICJ affirmed in its 1986 case about Military and Paramilitary Activities in Nicaragua:

 

“[A]dherence by a State to any particular doctrine does not constitute a violation of customary international law; to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fundamental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole of international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the political, social, economic and cultural system of a State.”[2]

 

Nevertheless, the changes occurred in the last decades have radically altered radically the panorama in which the ruling was delivered. These events have led some scholars to argue the appearance of a fledgling internationally customary norm by which there is a right to democracy. Now individuals could internationally assert a right to enjoy a democratic regime. Undoubtedly, this argument has been contested. The objective of this assignment is to observe if such a norm does already exist. It is submitted here that in general international law there is not yet a right to democratic governance; rather there is such an entitlement in the Western world as a special customary norm.

 

1. THE DEMOCRATIC ENTITLEMENT SCHOOL

 

The end of the Cold War marked the end of an era and the success of the West over the East, according to the triumphalists. The liberal democracy, with its multi-party elections, freedom of voting, expression and association concurrent with a free-market economy proved to be a better form of governance, or at least more durable. Indeed, it triggered major changes in the international sphere, and international law was not alien to the development. As underlined by Fox, “[i]nternational law, like all law, is essentially reactive in nature. Norms and institutions…arise not in a vacuum or as part of a coherent theoretical scheme, but in response to specific events.”[3] Indeed, for certain scholars one of the mayor alterations was the emergence of the right to democratic governance. The so-called “democratic entitlement” school - named after and led by Franck’s seminal article[4] - considers that it could be observed as a nascent norm by which citizens could now enjoy a right to democracy.

 

Their assertion was based fundamentally on three premises. First, the demise of the Soviet Union and the subsequent termination of a bipolar world ended the struggle for power. In other words, realpolitik stopped being the only driving force behind both superpowers, putting an end to disregarding the respect for human rights and democracy in favour of ideological affinity; at the same time permitted the termination of discussions over what was a real “democracy”. Second, the collapse caused the flourishing of democracies throughout the world that were committed to the model which just won the Cold War, which was holding free and fair elections as the liberal model. Moreover, states were willing to overthrow or punish those prepared to oust democratically elected leaders – e.g. Haiti. Last but not least, the entitlement could be inferred from a vast amount of “hard” and “soft” law proliferated since the inception of the UN. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the multiple General Assembly Resolutions or the 1999 Resolution of the Commission on the Human Rights entitled “Promotion of the Right to Democracy”[5] create, as the argument goes, a consistent normative body expressing this entitlement. The conjunction of these elements expresses both a sufficient practice and opinio juris to materialize as a customary norm as well as the shaping of a new paradigm. “[I]nternational law recognises only one legitimate way to ensure that a people’s rights to self-determination and free expression have been respected: through genuine and periodic elections.”[6] This last assertion is capital for the argument because it gives determinacy to the concept of democracy and “which makes its message clear”[7]. Otherwise it would not be possible to give right to something undefined; it would be a vacuous entitlement.

 

Indubitably, the consequences of the advent of such a norm in the international legal framework would have far-reaching upshots. The most obvious would be the prohibition upon nations to not depose their own democratic governments.[8] In other words, any action that would provoke a democratic reverse would be forbidden.[9] Furthermore, the rationale behind the idea is that democracy is the ultimate human rights as it is deemed the best guarantor of them. A democratic governance is more open to a compliance system of human rights by a teleological notion of democracy. Thus, democracy as such would become the central thrust of the international community and of the legal order. Subsequently, it would allow the use of force upon those states that could be depicted as undemocratic. Even more dangerous than an arbitrary use of force by some states upon others using as an excuse “a right to democratic governance”, is the fact that it divides the international legal order between two different types of regimes, which could have the potential to fracture one of the system’s mainstay. Predictably, the argument advanced by this school of thought has several inconveniences that can impair the transformation of the emergence of this rule into a proper, fully established norm.

 

2. THE LIMITS OF A GENERAL CUSTOMARY RIGHT TO DEMOCRACY

 

The main inconvenience, which goes against the effectiveness of it, is the exact content of democracy - despite Fox’s lengthy explanation justifying it.[10] Democracy is a contested concept, which sometimes provokes the spill-over of the implicit problems by its vagueness in the legal sphere. This lack of consensus[11] over minimum requirements hinders the efforts by the democratic entitlement school. Their emphasis on a Western based democratic model collides with other equally democratic types. As asserted by Mutua, the standard proposed by them is built in a series of core rights that “can only be realized and protected in a political society organized through the liberal democratic framework”[12]. Likewise, its admissibility could have the potentially devastating effect of silencing and concealing different democratic movements along with their knowledge.[13] By the same token, their minimalist approach towards democracy – a process-oriented version based on free and fair elections, freedom of expression, free market economy and so on – could drain its “emancipatory potential.”[14] It could sustain states that only pay a lip-service to democracy. Koskenniemi goes even a step further by simply denouncing the difficulties of grasping a universal rule of democracy and therefore proposing to drop any attempt of conceiving a common precept, proposing instead the adoption of a either mere modest account.[15] All these explanations only stress what has been stated at the beginning of the paragraph: the absence of conformity over a given definition is the crucial element, as will be shown later, in the existence of a right to democracy. Reservations about the obnoxious influence of the model proposed by the democratic entitlement school ignore how other equally contested - and Western - concepts have evolved. Self-determination, for instance, is a paradigmatic case; it was borne out of the French Revolution as a political entitlement. Despite its origin, it became normative; and it helped to emancipate all those countries that had been colonized. For this reason, Koskenniemi’s argument should be dismissed. Democracy, despite its problematic, is being used increasingly in more legal instruments. It is therefore unrealistic to simply ignore the treatment given to it, because it will not be the last appearance of a contested concept in the juridical sphere.

 

More relevant and which also undermines the case for a right to democratic governance is their “selective bias” with regards to justifying the existence of the norm. In Macdonald’s words – though he is talking about Franck’s article, the criticism can be also extended to his accolades:

 

“[I]n looking for the emergence and crystallisation of a norm into a rule of custom by means solely of an investigation into its legitimacy… here is a sense in which he assumes the existence of that which he seeks to demonstrate. An examination of whether a rule is more or less legitimate only makes sense if the existence of the rule is taken for granted, and it could thus be argued that [his] conclusions are undermined by a selective bias in the evidence he produces to support his propositions, occasioned by uncritical acceptance of a contestable premise.”[16]

 

This leads me to their use of sources for backing up their arguments. First, the employment of normative instruments like the covenants on human rights is done after a “wishful reading.”[17] They ignored the reservations made to them. The same can be argued with respect to the GA Resolutions. The organ can pass resolutions that contradict themselves. In one it can endorse Franck’s proposal and in other can state that the diversity of states impedes the application of a unique formula, and both resolutions accruing similar supports.[18] Indeed, if we combine them with the declarations issued by several states-representatives – especially from Asia – claiming the difference of values, it undermines the existence of sufficient opinio juris coming from the international community. A similar obstacle is encountered respecting the practice. Here, Carothers claims, despite the fact that they were made long ago, that the augment of the number of democracies all over the world was overstated because it was mainly a Western phenomenon remain as true as before.[19] After the dramatic increase of the 1990s, the tide of democratization has remained stable even with some setbacks. Pakistan can be an illustrative case of lack of normative force behind the entitlement to democratic governance. Despite the coup d’etat, Musharraf remained as Head of State for almost nine years. The (political) complains about his authoritarian rule was washed away after September 11. The US decided that it needed his help more against the Taliban, than pressuring him for becoming a democracy. Only after political problems, he abandoned power, not before. The attitude of the US in this case is exemplary of a broader trend. In short, the practice is wildly inconsistent.

 

From the conjunction of all these reflections can be inferred that the democratic entitlement is still a lege ferenda right, there is not enough proof of the establishment of a general customary rule. After almost twenty years since Franck’s article, the emerging right to democratic governance persists as an emerging right, or as Petersen argues as “a right to the emergence of democratic governance”[20]. How ironic to end with fashionable sophistication after so many years of discussing the topic with a similar idea already advanced by Steiner more than a decade ago.[21] Nonetheless, that cannot obscure the present importance of democracy in the international legal grammar. As Crawford notes, “[r]eferences to democracy…are entering into the justification of legal decision-making in a new way.”[22] But the lack of a general customary rule does not automatically entail the dismissal of the existence of such a norm in a different plane.

 

3. THE CASE FOR THE WEST

 

As a general rule, customary law is of universal character, binding all states regardless of their participation in its elaboration. Occasionally, as an exception, the emerging law can arise affecting only certain states. This divergence is labelled as a special or local customary law “which [by definition] are applicable only within a defined group of States.”[23] The ICJ admitted the possibility of its reality in the Asylum case[24]. Consequently, it can be argued that there is a special customary norm within the Western world by which citizens have a right to democratic governance. The problems encountered at the universal level are partially the very same that confirm the existence of the entitlement at a lower level.

 

On the one hand, the competing definitions hovering around the concept of democracy disappear once the focus is directed towards the Western world. In other words, there is a constant consensus of what has to be a democracy, and which is the one furthered by the democratic entitlement school. A procedural version which emphasizes the relevance of freedom of expression and association, the celebration of free and fair multi-party elections along with a free market system is rather the norm and what is accepted as democracy than an exception. On the other hand, there is a constant practice and opinio juris over the existence of the rule by the people. An illustrative example is the European Union, which makes direct references to democracy, even stating in the Treaty of Lisbon that the basic form of democracy is the representative; that is the process-oriented definition[25]. Moreover, this is not limited to a European phenomenon. The failed 2002 coup d’etat steered to oust Hugo Chávez from the Venezuelan Presidency displays how entrenched  the idea of democracy is nowadays within the West and that any change of government has to be done by means of ballots and not through illegitimate methods anymore. To put it briefly, there is the evidence of a regional or special customary rule. Here practice, in particular after the Cold War, has been consistent, states do really have the belief to be legally bound to a norm stating that individuals have a right to democracy, and there is a clear determinacy of the content of such an entitlement.

 

4. CONCLUSION

 

International law as it stands is the consequence of social encounters which as a result mirrors the community directed to regulate. The lack of agreement on the content of democracy, and subsequently over the right to democracy, reflects the situation of the international community. Therefore there is not yet a general customary norm expressing a right to democratic governance. However, the cultural and political homogeneity of the West produces the opposite: the reality of the entitlement.

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[1] Emphasis added.

[2] Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, 1986, ICJ Reports 14, at 133.

[3] Fox, G., “Election Monitoring: The International Legal Setting”, 19 Wis. Int’l L. J. 295, 295 (2000-2001).

[4] Franck, T., “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 AJIL 47 (1992).

[5] Com. Human Rights, Res 1999/57, 27th April 1999.

[6] Macdonald, E., “International Law, Democratic Governance and September the 11^th”, 3 GLJ 9 (2002).

[7] See Franck, op. cit., 56ff.

[8] D’Amato, A., “Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of Paradigms”, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 47, 91 (1995-1996).

[9] Petersen, N., “The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law”, 34 Brook. J. Int’l L 35, 81 (2008).

[10] Fox, G., “The Right to Political Participation in International Law”, 17 Yale J. Int’l L. 539 (1992).

[11] Whitehead, L., Democratization: Theory and Experience 14 (2002).

[12] Mutua, M., “The Ideology of Human Rights”, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 589, 594 n. 12 (1995-1996).

[13] Otto, D., “Challenging the ‘New World Order’: International Law, Global Democracy and the Possibilities for Women”, 3 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 371, 384 (1993)

[14] Marks, S., “The ‘Emerging Norm': Conceptualizing ‘Democratic Governance'”, 91 ASIL Proceedings 372, 376 (1997).

[15] Koskenniemi, M. “Intolerant Democracies”: A Reaction”, 37 Harv. Int’l L. J. 231, 235 (1996).

[16] Macdonald, op. cit., par. 7.

[17] Roth, B., Governmental Illegitimacy in International Law 231 (1999).

[18] Fox, G. & Roth, B, “Introduction: The Spread of Liberal Democracy and its Implications for International Law", in Fox & Roth (eds.) Democratic Governance and International Law 1, 3 (2000); and Macdonald, op. cit., par. 8.

[19] Carothers, T., “Empirical Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law”, 86 ASIL Proceedings 261 (1992).

[20] Petersen, op. cit., 84.

[21] Steiner, H., “Political Participation as a Human Right”, 1 Harv. Hum. Rts Y.B. 77, 129ff (1988).

[22] Crawford, J., “Democracy and the Body of International Law", in Fox and Roth (eds.), op. cit., 91, at 102 (2000).

[23] Thirlway, H., “The Sources of International Law”, in Evans, M. (ed.), International Law (2^nd ed.) 115, at 125 (2006).

[24] See Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment 1950, ICJ Rep. 266, at 276.

[25] Treaty of Lisbon, EU Doc. 2007/C 306/01, Article 1.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia as States: a factual fiction?

En homenaje a Citoyen, yo también voy a poner mis papers y tonteridas varias en sustitucion de entradas normales, además de reincorporarme a la red. Perdonad el inglés, by the way:

1. INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Decrees by Russian President Medvedev whereby he recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as States was the climax of a turbulent summer. Through this assignment we are going to try to analyze the assertion. For that purpose, we will have to study first the concept of statehood and its main characteristics, whether self-determination plays a role in this situation, end with recognition and the inevitable conclusion.

2. STATEHOOD

States are the core elements of International Law. Despite that, there is no definition of what they are, not even in legal instruments[1]. This problem may have occurred “because the question normally arises only in the borderline cases, where a new entity has emerged bearing some but not all characteristics of statehood”[2]. However, there are some elements in order to find out whether an entity is a State, drawn upon the practice and the doctrine. For that, we have to read the formulation laid down in Article I of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, which has become “the best known formulation of the basic criteria of statehood”[3], and subsequently a norm of customary law[4], not the Article itself but the elements. According to the precept we can consider that an entity is a State when it has a) permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.

Behind those requirements underlies the principle of effectiveness; they are trying to guarantee that the entity can act effectively[5].

2.1.A Permanent Population

We can define the population as the group of people that permanently inhabit the territory of a State and they are generally related to it by the nationality link[6]. As regards to the requirement of permanent, we can say that it does not mean that they have to be within the State all the time. It is enough to stay for a period of time[7]. It also does not relevant how much people leave.

2.2.A Defined Territory

The territory is the spatial space where the state organization exercises its own authority with fullness, excluding any State trying to claim those same powers[8]. As with the population, there is not a minimum required area for it to be considered as a State. Also, the State does not have to precise exactly limits its boundaries precisely. As the ICJ ruled in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases “[t]here is…no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often…they are not”[9].

2.3.A Government

While the other two criteria can be measured with objectivity, this is the hardest to gauge and the most important; to have a Government is central for the acquirement of the quality of State. In other words, the fact that there is an effective Government means that there is a population and a territory to govern[10]. In order to achieve this criterion it is not necessary to have a specific form of government. This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Western Sahara case, which stated that there was not any in International Law which “requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern”[11]. That is why most scholars, and the practice has shown, linked the existence of a Government with effectivité, which can be translated as the ability of the State to enjoy “the habitual obedience of the bulk of the population”[12] and to carry out with normality the state functions (internal effectiveness) and being able to act and interact in the legal order on behalf the entity (external effectiveness)[13].

Nonetheless, if we take into account the practice of States we can perceive that effectivité is not as absolute as it may sound. The practice shows us that “the requirement of ‘government’ is less stringent than has been thought” and the right and exercise of the authority is important, not only his actual effectiveness[14].

2.4.Capacity To Enter Into Relations With Other States

This is the least useful of the four criteria used by the Montevideo Convention. As it has been expressed, this requirement is a consequence of the existence of an independent Government, because it only has the capacity to enter into relations with other states in case when there is an effective authority capable and able to interact in the international order[15].

2.5.Independence

Due to the insufficiencies and the criticisms poured over the Montevideo Convention, other authors have tried to evaluate other requirements which can be essential to the concept of statehood. Even though there are various, the most important and with more impact in the practice has been the criterion of independence[16].

For many, the independence of the State is the decisive factor[17], which means that the authority which is representing an entity can act and function independently “of that of any other State”[18]. While it is difficult to measure how much is a State independent, we could assert that would include “the exercise of substantial governmental authority with respect to some territory and people” and “the absence of subjection to the authority of another State or States”[19]. That is the reason behind the non-recognition of Manchukuo, because it was an artificial State, a ‘puppet-State’.

2.6.Consequences

Once an entity has acquired de facto the criteria explained above, independently by which way it was created, we can assert that it exists as a State. This does not signify that the entity will become part of the international legal order, as the practice has shown us. For it to be fully accepted it has to be created legally and/or to be recognized. That is why it is necessary to give a look to the concept of self-determination and the institution of recognition[20].

3. SELF-DETERMINATION

Due to the constant efforts throughout the United Nations of the countries borne from colonization, self-determination was converted in a legal principle, though in a narrow sense. If we combine the articles from the Charter[21] with GA Resolutions 1514[22], 1541[23], 2625[24], Article 2 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights[25], and the ICJ rulings in the Western Sahara[26] and East Timor[27] cases we can observe that the right of self-determination has been limited to those regions that were under the dominance of the Western countries[28].

In spite of that, there have been intentions on giving a broader sense to the legal notion, attempting to extend the right beyond decolonization. Some scholars have argued that behind the notion of self-determination any people can do it. In that sense, they talk about a double dimension of the idea: internal and external self-determination, which allows it in extreme circumstances to separate from a State, the so-called “remedial secession”[29]. Unfortunately, the practice of the States and the current state of the law demonstrates us that there is not yet such a broad self-determination; it has remained in the decolonization sphere, which means that beyond that sphere there is no right to self-determination, that is, to secede.

Said that, we need to stress that there is no rule in International Law which prohibits secession per se[30] - which is quite different to not having a right -, but the rules discourage such actions. The uti possidetis and the respect to the territorial integrity principles remain strong[31]. The success of an entity in seceding from the parent State is based on being recognized by other States. For that reason, we need to look at that institution.

4. RECOGNITION

Recognition is the action by which States consider that an entity has met all the requirements of statehood and has recognized it as such, and it is by his nature an act of political discretion. There are two main strands: the constitutive theory, which says that a State becomes one only until other States do so (status-creating) and the declaratory theory, which asserts that a State is one if it meets all the requirements (status-confirming)[32]. Both theories have proved wrong, as “life proves to be stronger than doctrine”[33]. At the moment we could say that recognition has a powerful effectiveness effect: maybe an entity can be a State, but if the other States do not recognized it, such an entity will not be able to function with efficacy in the international realm, despite being a State.

As Carrillo Salcedo pointed out, the institution of recognition has a powerful leverage. If many States recognize an entity as a State, that reinforces the political and juridical reality of it; “in other words, the recognition by the other States is not a necessary condition for the existence of the new State, but it does consolidate its international subjectivity and its insertion in the international community, even to those States who have not recognized it”[34]. That signifies that the approach of the States has been as a “peer-review” process, in the sense that they are the only ones who admit if the new candidate can enter the club[35].

Kosovo is a useful example: according to what we have seen, the secession of the country was illegal because it did not have the right to self-determination. However, the way it was recognized gave it the legitimacy it lacked legally.

5. CASE STUDY

According to what we have explained we could argue that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia have a right to self-determination or to secede from Georgia. However, that does not impede that they could not become States if they meet the criteria listed above. Both entities have a permanent population, a defined territory and even governments enough strong for maintaining the order. Moreover, both regions have been de facto independent from Georgia since the 1990s.

Nevertheless, they failed in the most important criterion: independence. As has been widely reported, both regions have been under the presence of Russian forces even before the outbreak of last summer[36], and they have Russian passports apart from economic aid they receive[37]. What is more evident of a lack independence is the fact that Abkhazia requested the Russians to represent its interests abroad[38] and South Ossetia wants to unify with North Ossetia and does not mind being part of Russia if that is the case[39]. All those facts are very clarifying: they cannot act and function independently from other State. Despite the fact that both entities “seeks to separate itself from the State to which it belongs” they do not seek to “create a new State”[40] up to the moment. Even recognition will not be enough, because there have been few who do recognize them and they do not have enough force to overcome the illegality of the situation and does not help to enter into relations with other States.

Even though every situation has its particular traits, there is a situation similar to this: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is true that the events that led to the Cyprus conflict differ from the once that occurred this summer, but the outcome was similar. The Republic has survived due to the support and protection of Turkey, as it looks like in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Bangladesh could be also helpful in this case. We could argue that the help from Russia, like the Indian one in the 1970s, has been crucial to definitely separate the two regions from Georgia, which was trying to regain the control there.

6. CONCLUSION

After reviewing and evaluating the requirements that an entity needs to be qualified as a State, we can assert that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia can be considered such. However, politics can always surprise.

---

[1] B. Vukas, ‘States, Peoples and Minorities’, 231 RCADI 263, at 280 (1991-VI); M. Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público 273 (2007); and J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 31 (2006). For some definitions see T.D. Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents’, 37 CJTL 403, at 409-410 (1999).

[2] See Crawford, supra note 1, at 40.

[3] Id., at 45.

[4] B. Vukas, supra note 1, at 281 and M. Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’ – The Resurrection of Somaliland Against All International ‘Odds’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and Human Rights, at 12, n.29 (2004).

[5] J. Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law’, 48 BYIL 93, at 111 (1976-1977).

[6] Diez de Velasco, supra note 1, at 274.

[7] Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 13.

[8] Diez de Velasco, supra note 1, at 274.

[9] North Sea Continental Shelf, (Germany v. Denmark/ Netherlands), Judgement, 20 February, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, at 32, par. 46.

[10] Crawford, supra note 1, at 55-56.

[11] Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 16 October, 1975 ICJ Rep. 3, at 43, par. 63.

[12] H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 28 (1947).

[13] Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 14-15; Vukas, supra note 1, at 288 et seq.

[14] Crawford, supra note 1, at 57. It is also interesting to observe that there were cases where the effectiveness of an authority was insufficient to back the statehood, see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 71 (2006).

[15] See Crawford, supra note 1, at 61; Crawford, supra note 4, at 119; Brownlie, supra note 14, at 71; Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 17.

[16] See Grant, supra note 1, at 438 et seq.

[17] See Brownlie, supra note 14, at 71, note 16 and Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 17, n.60.

[18] Lauterpacht, supra note 12, at 26.

[19] Crawford, supra note 1, at 66.

[20] For a thorough account of the relationship between legality and statehood see Crawford, supra note 1, 97ss. See also D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 153 (2002).

[21] Art. 1.2, 55, 73, and 76.b.

[22] UN Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

[23] UN Doc. A/RES/1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960.

[24] UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

[25] UN Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.

[26] Supra note 11.

[27] East Timor, (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 30 June, 1995 ICJ Rep. 2, at 102, par. 29.

[28] See D. F. Orentlicher, ‘Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims’, 23 Yale Journal of International Law 1, at 42 (1998); Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 77-78; see also J. Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’, 69 BYIL 85, at 113 (1998); and A. Cassese, Self-Determination of People: a legal reappraisal 33 et seq. and 92 et seq (1995).

[29] See C. Tomuschat, ‘Secession and self-determination’, in M.G. Kohen (Ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives, 23 at 38 (2006).

[30] Id., at 31 and J. Dugard and D. Raic, ‘The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession’, in Kohen, supra note 22, 94 at 102.

[31] See M. N. Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’, 67 BYIL 75 (1996); see also Crawford, supra note 21, at 85 et seq.

[32] S. Talmon, ‘The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium non Datur?’, 75 BYIL 101, at 101 (2004).

[33] N. Schrijver, ‘Can the Cause of Human Rights Justify Breaking Up a State? Reflections on Secession and the Ban on the Use of Force’, in K. Arts & P. Mihyo (Eds.), Responding to the Human Rights Deficit – Essays in Honour of Bas de Gaay Fortman, 49 at 51 (2003); Also I. Brownlie, ‘Recognition in Theory and Practice’, 53 BYIL 197 (1983).

[34] J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, Curso de derecho internacional público: introducción a su estructura, dinámica y funciones 47 (1991). (Translation by us)

[35] O.Ch. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood – International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa 55 (2000).

[36] ‘From frozen to boiling’, The Economist, 17 April 2008, (http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11043570) (Last seen 21 Sept.)

[37] ‘If Kosovo goes free’, The Economist, 29 November 2007, (httphttp://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10225052) (Last seen 21 Sept.)

[38] T. Halpin, ‘Kremlin announces that South Ossetia will join ‘one united Russia state’, The Times, 30 August 2008, (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4635843.ece) (Last seen 21 Sept.)

[39] See supra note 37.

[40] See Crawford, supra note 24, at 85.

sobre Naciones Unidas

Me encanta leer cosas como esta:

The Economist, March 15th-21st 2008, p. 71:

"The oddity in hindsight is that most of the malefactors seem to have been businessmen, not members of the UN bureaucracy, which many American congressmen denounced as a nest of corruption. So far only two UN officials have been charged with oil-for-food offences - Mr Yakovlev, and Benon Sevan, who ran the programme. Charged with taking nearly $160.000 in bribes, he has fled to his native Cyprus. Arguably, the real culprits at the UN were not its officials but the Security Council, whose five permanent members invented a scheme that was wide open to abuse but who failed to impose the necessary safeguards."

Dedicado con cariño a todos aquellos amigos de las Naciones Unidas que de manera torticera y/o por desconocimiento le echan la culpa de todos los males del planeta y del más allá.

Para aquellos momentos intempestivos

un repaso a la política exterior.

Ya que parece ser se acercan elecciones en este nuestro país, resulta siempre interesante abordar cómo ha sido la legislatura y especificamente, por la temática de este blog, la política exterior desarrollada por el actual gobierno. Aunque en casi todas las elecciones - por no decir todas - la actuación allende nuestras fronteras siempre queda excluida, considerada por parte de los electores como una algo irrelevante a la hora de decidir el voto; desde aquí, se quiere resaltar lo importante que es en la actualidad el desarrollo de una política que no se abstraiga demasiado de los temas nacionales. Cuando nos encontramos en una constante mundialización, la relación con terceros es, si cabe, primordial.

Se puede decir que en lineas generales la actuación de este gobierno es mediocre. Un rasgo característico ha sido la indefinición más allá de ciertas ideas generales que no aportan nada al desempeño concreto de las funciones en el ámbito anterior. Esta vaguedad hay que reprocharselo a Zapatero, su escaso interés ha situado a España en territorio de nadie. Mientras que al menos el anterior Presidente tenía las ideas claras, aunque sus argumentos y acciones fueran equivocadas, lo que redundaba en saber a qué atenernos, con este gobierno a veces resulta arduo adivinar sus intenciones. Es por ello, que este post va a intentar evaluar - de manera subjetiva - alguna de las cuestiones suscitadas en esta legislatura:

1) Nefasto Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores. La elección de Moratinos ha mostrado ser desacertada, si bien, en su descargo hay que mencionar dos circunstancias: a) el puesto parece gafado, Moratinos no es el primero que demuestra ineptitud en su puesto, Ana Palacios y Josep "medoblocomounbambú" Piqué tampoco fueron mejores que lo hecho por el Ministro b) quién dicta la política exterior es el Presidente del Gobierno. Por tanto, es él quién decide qué hacer o qué políticas a realizar, lo que ha perjudicado en el margen de maniobra de Moratinos, pues tenía que someterse a sus directrices.

No obstante, eso no quita que su manejo de los problemas, sus salidas de tonos y su perceptible incapacidad para hacerse notar, fuera o no fuera cierto, le han convertido en un Ministro endeble. No merece continuar en la próxima legislatura en el cargo.

2) Oportunidad desaprovechada en Europa. Aunque con la llegada de Merkel y Sarkozy, más la salida de Tony Blair - lo digo por ser más que nada un lame duck - ha permitido que se vuelva a, por lo menos, tener una idea de que hacer o como hacer avancer el proyecto europeo, hubo un momento en el cual Zapatero tendría que haber liderado a la Unión y sacarla del atolladero en el que estaba sumida. En vez de actuar, se ocultó, observando a ver que pasaba y sin una noción clara de hacia donde ir. Si se le suma a todo eso su desinterés por el exterior nos encontramos conque España influye menos de lo que debería.

3) El magreb. Sólo me voy a referir a una cosa: el Sahara Occidental. Como ya hizo González - Aznar sólo apoyó al Frente por molestar a Marruecos, más que por convicción - Zapatero ha ido suscribiendo los argumentos del país ¿alahui?.

Hasta aquí los debe más reseñables. Latinoamérica está más o menos igual y África nunca ha sido una prioridad para los sucesivos gobiernos españoles.

No obstante, no todo ha sido negativo, ha habido actuaciones positivas que quiero apuntar:

1) La retirada de Iraq. Puede que las formas fueran precipitadas, pero en conjunto, lo hecho fue lo que convenía hacer. Además, lo prometió durante la campaña electoral, junto con que tenía el apoyo mayoritario de la población. No se le puede reprochar.

2) Aunque no es santo de mi devoción ésta, creo que conviene resaltarla: la Alianza de las Civilizaciones. En general, es una chorrada, lleno de palabras bonitas, sin actuaciones concretas, pero una cosa tengo clara, sólo con la fuerza no se va a ningún lado.

sorpresas de los países serios

Titular de una noticia:

"Inequality law may close (...) firms"

Así a bote pronto se puede pensar que estamos ante una noticia sobre España y la Ley de Igualdad, y que en el exterior se han dado cuenta de la barbaridad que va a hacer el Presidente Zapatero en pos de la igualdad, metiendo sus zarpas en el sacrosanto mercado libre y demostrando una vez más nuestro Presidente su sectarismo y deficiencias intelectuales. Sin embargo, el titular se refiere a otro Estado: Noruega.

Pues sí, en el año 2003 el país de los salmones y el petroleo promulgó una Ley que requería que al menos el 40% de los sitios de una junta directiva fueran a parar a manos de las mujeres. Y a la vista de los resultados a funcionado, mientras que en 2001 sólo el 6% de los puestos eran mujeres, en la actualidad alcanza el 37%, convirtiendo a Noruega en el país con mayor proporción de mujeres en los consejos. Suecia viene la segunda con el 19%.

Otro dato sorprendente es que la promotora de la Ley no fué una feminista bollera con ansias de destruir el capitalismo sino por la secretaria de industria y comercio del partido Conservador, la señora Ansgar Gabrielsen. Según la susodicha la razón por la que insistió en la Ley radicaba en que:

"I could not see why, after 25-30 years of having an equal ratio of women and men in universities and with having so many educated women with experience, there were so few of them on boards".

Además parte de la desigualdad no radicaba en la sabia mano invisible o del panadero codicioso, al contrario, ella

"saw how board members were picked: they come from the same small circle of people. They go hunting and fishing together. They're buddies".

En atención a tales circunstancias se aprobó la ley y es posible que las compañias que no cumplan serán cerradas de acuerdo con las sanciones previstas en el texto jurídico.

Sin duda el ejemplo de Noruega ha podido servir de modelo de referencia para el actual Gobierno, asimismo, nos sirve de ejemplo para actuar en circunstancias semejantes. Aunque personalmente sigo dudando de la eficacia de la ley aprobada en España, quiero poner de relieve como en otros países que no están llenos de progres irredentos, cobardes, que no paran de fumar porro y lo peor de todo pacifistas¡¡ también realizan actuaciones parecidas, y con éxito como se puede comprobar.

John Bolton y su rabia contenida.

Si atendemos a las críticas realizadas tanto por el The Economist y por el Financial Times se puede deducir que el libro escrito por John Bolton Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations es una ocasión perdida para comprender mejor la política exterior de George Bush. Y es una pena que esto sea así, pues hubiera permitido conocer en mejor medida ciertas actitudes y posiciones tomadas por la administración estadounidense, acertadas o erróneas.

Como resalta la opinión de Gideon Rachman en el FT en el libro hay citas y reflexiones interesantes, en cuanto que también controvertidas, que no son explicadas, dejando al lector sumido en un poso de dudas o incredulidad. Así, llega a afirmar que los "treaties [son] essentially only political documents, and the whole debate over what was 'legally binding' in 'international law' as just another theological issue". Sin duda a aquellos que hemos estudiado el Derecho Internacional una enunciación de tal calibre hubiera sido importante que hubiera matizado el alcance de su frase. No obstante, como señala Rachman, no explica nada más.

Si bien, frases como la arriba mencionada no son la excepción y si la regla. Bajo tales afirmaciones subyace una concepción del Derecho Internacional en la cual queda reducido a un mero instrumento de poder utilizado por los Estados, principalmente por Estados Unidos, para hacer lo que les venga en gana sin respetar nada. Es cierto que su formación es reflejo de la comunidad internacional existente y de los equilibrios de poderes substantivos. No obstante, el Derecho Internacional es más que eso y tiene una profundidad mayor que personas como Bolton desearían.

Otro ejemplo claro de su desconocimiento del Derecho Internacional puede observarse en la revista The American Interest, en cuyo número 4, donde aparece el ex-embajador ante la ONU en una amplia entrevista. En la susodicha revista John Bolton, afirma que el Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas es una mera figura administrativa, negando que pueda ser una especie de "world's chief diplomat". Es cierto que la propia Carta declara que el Secretario es un "chief executive officer", pero si se atiende a lo que tenía en mente los padres fundadores, a fuentes del Derecho Internacional como la costumbre, se puede manifestar que la función de aquel no ha sido nunca meramente de mero administrador. El propio articulado le reserva una función eminentemente política en su artículo 99 donde "[e]l Secretario General podrá llamar la atención del Consejo de Seguridad hacia cualquier asunto que en su opinión pueda poner en peligro el mantenimiento de la paz y seguridad internacionales". Tal opción como el artículo describe permite poner en aviso sobre cualquier situación que considere importante, no está limitado a las circunstancias que obliga al Consejo sólo a funcionar cuando se de una situación que realmente esté poniendo en peligro la paz y seguridad internacionales.

Por tanto, con citas como la arriba descrita se puede entender ese desprecio ante el Derecho Internacional, erroneo por otra parte, además de demostrar una ignorancia (consciente o no) de como funcionan las cosas.

unas pinceladas sobre el conflicto colombiano

Normalmente, Iñigo Sáenz de Ugarte - atendiendo a su blog únicamente - es una persona razonable y sensata, esto es, no se deja llevar por las simplificaciones y ofrece perspectivas nada prejuiciosas. Sin embargo, eso no impide que de vez en cuando, como a todos por otra parte, se deje llevar por la marea y nos ofrezca declaraciones un poco altisonantes.

Así, desde que empezó a trabajar y escribir regularmente para el periódico Público ha sido - y sigue siendo - uno de los baluartes más importantes. Pero parece ser que se esta dejando influenciar por cierto maniqueismo que subyace en el rotativo. La columna que ha escrito hoy sobre el sempiterno conflicto colombiano adolece, en mi opinión, de consistencia en algunos aspectos. Veámos primero el contenido de su columna y los párrafos más relevantes:

"Después de meses de gestiones discretas alentadas desde distintos puntos, Chávez ha acabado topándose con el mismo muro con el que se han chocado antes decenas de mediadores. (...) Ningún dirigente latinoamericano dormiría muy tranquilo si supiera que Chávez - revolucionario y protagonista de un golpe frustado en 1992 - está en contacto con sus militares. (...) El error [haber llamado al general colombiano Mario Montoya en vez de su a homólogo Uribe] - si se ha producido en los términos descritos por los colombianos - ha sido la excusa perfecta para que Uribe se deshaga de una mediación que se acercaba al momento de la verdad. ¿Era ése el momento que Uribe esperaba que nunca llegaría?. Las FARC no estaban por la labor de permitir un simple intercambio de cautivos. Querían liberar a los suyos, pero sobre todo buscaban legitimidad. Como en el anterior proceso de paz, exigían que el Ejército se retirara de dos zonas que serían ocupadas por ellos durante las negociaciones. Precisamente lo que Uribe no está dispuesto a permitir. En América Latina a casi todos los dirigentes les gusta ir de tipos duros." (negritas mías)

Lo que da a entender la opinión es que Uribe ha hecho mal en cortar y finiquitar las negociaciones que Chávez estaba realizando porque simplemente el Presidente colombiano no quiere en realidad negociar y que quiere demostrar su dureza impidiendo cualquier acuerdo o resultado de las negociaciones con las FARC.

Aunque puede ser cierto, y atendiendo a las acciones llevadas a cabo por Uribe, Iñigo pone de relieve parte de la problemática colombiana. Sin embargo, en esta circunstancia me parece que es razonable lo realizado por el Presidente colombiano.

En esta ocasión Chávez ha incumplido lo que le advirtieron que no hiciera. Con la llamada al general saltándose la linea de mando quebró la confianza que podía tener Uribe en el venezolano. Si se le marca su ámbito de actuación y en vez de atenerse a ello lo rompe, el colombiano está, por tanto, en su derecho de no continuar con las negociaciones. En este tipo de actividades la confianza es un elemento primordial, más si hablamos de alguien como Chávez, charlatán y con problemas de autoestima. Si en una negociación el representante incumple el acuerdo establecido con el representado, este último tiene la potestad de romperlo y de no obligarse por lo acordado. En este caso más que nunca.

Aparte, el artículo señala la legitimidad y que en el conlficto colombiano, del que reconozco que se poco, es una circunstancia muy relevante para el derecho internacional. En el ámbito supranacional sólo hay una serie de actores que son reconocidos como sujeto de derecho internacional. Los sujetos clásicos son los Estados y con el advenimiento del nuevo orden mundial establecido tras la 2ª Guerra Mundial provocó la aparición y aceptación definitiva de un nuevo actor: las Organizaciones Internacionales. Aparte de ambos, a diferencia de las relaciones internacionales, son escasas las figuras que son reconocidas completamente o parcialmente por el derecho internacional, su aceptación en el ordenamiento jurídico internacional supone consecuencias relevantes puesto que significa la ostentación de derechos y responsabilidades.

Un mecanismo clásico es el reconocimiento. Mientras que para el reconocimiento de Estados por parte de otros Estados es un acto declarativo, puesto que la existencia de facto del país es innegable, y por mucho que haya países que se opongan o no admitan la existencia no afecta a la vida del Estado, no es una declaración constitutiva, y por tanto, las únicas consecuencias que se derivan es la no concesión, por parte de los países que se niegan a reconocer, del establecimiento de relaciones recíprocas en el trato.

Adempero, para los grupos insurgentes las consecuencias de ser reconocidas y legitimadas son importantes. El caso más ejemplar es el colombiano, pues nos encontramos con la existencia de dos gobiernos que controlan dos partes distintas y diferenciadas del territorio del Estado. En este caso si algún gobierno reconoce a las FARC, esto es le otorga cierta capacidad jurídica internacional, da lugar a la concensión de ciertos derechos y responsabilidades. Esto puede ser perjudicial para el gobierno colombiano, de ahí su crítica a cualquier acto que pueda reforzar y dar legitimad a la guerrilla.

No obstante, el derecho internacional mantiene la asimetría entre ambos gobiernos y favorece al mantenimiento del gobierno que ha sufrido la insurrección con ciertas soluciones jurídicas. Si las autoridades del Estado no reconocen la situación, no se aplican las leyes de guerras previstas para las supuestos de conflictos de carácter no internacional, aplicándose las disposiciones del Derecho Penal interno.

La entrada sin duda no va a resolver nada, mi desconocimiento en general, más allá de lo que uno haya leido en libros o medios de comunicación, de la situación y la complejidad del mismo ha dado lugar a una irregularidad manifiesta de los comentarios y argumentos expuestos.

Perdonen las imprecisiones, todo comentario que me corrija y mejore el texto será bienvenido.