Abkhazia and South Ossetia as States: a factual fiction?

En homenaje a Citoyen, yo también voy a poner mis papers y tonteridas varias en sustitucion de entradas normales, además de reincorporarme a la red. Perdonad el inglés, by the way:

1. INTRODUCTION

The signing of the Decrees by Russian President Medvedev whereby he recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia as States was the climax of a turbulent summer. Through this assignment we are going to try to analyze the assertion. For that purpose, we will have to study first the concept of statehood and its main characteristics, whether self-determination plays a role in this situation, end with recognition and the inevitable conclusion.

2. STATEHOOD

States are the core elements of International Law. Despite that, there is no definition of what they are, not even in legal instruments[1]. This problem may have occurred “because the question normally arises only in the borderline cases, where a new entity has emerged bearing some but not all characteristics of statehood”[2]. However, there are some elements in order to find out whether an entity is a State, drawn upon the practice and the doctrine. For that, we have to read the formulation laid down in Article I of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, which has become “the best known formulation of the basic criteria of statehood”[3], and subsequently a norm of customary law[4], not the Article itself but the elements. According to the precept we can consider that an entity is a State when it has a) permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other States.

Behind those requirements underlies the principle of effectiveness; they are trying to guarantee that the entity can act effectively[5].

2.1.A Permanent Population

We can define the population as the group of people that permanently inhabit the territory of a State and they are generally related to it by the nationality link[6]. As regards to the requirement of permanent, we can say that it does not mean that they have to be within the State all the time. It is enough to stay for a period of time[7]. It also does not relevant how much people leave.

2.2.A Defined Territory

The territory is the spatial space where the state organization exercises its own authority with fullness, excluding any State trying to claim those same powers[8]. As with the population, there is not a minimum required area for it to be considered as a State. Also, the State does not have to precise exactly limits its boundaries precisely. As the ICJ ruled in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases “[t]here is…no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and often…they are not”[9].

2.3.A Government

While the other two criteria can be measured with objectivity, this is the hardest to gauge and the most important; to have a Government is central for the acquirement of the quality of State. In other words, the fact that there is an effective Government means that there is a population and a territory to govern[10]. In order to achieve this criterion it is not necessary to have a specific form of government. This was confirmed by the ICJ in the Western Sahara case, which stated that there was not any in International Law which “requires the structure of a State to follow any particular pattern”[11]. That is why most scholars, and the practice has shown, linked the existence of a Government with effectivité, which can be translated as the ability of the State to enjoy “the habitual obedience of the bulk of the population”[12] and to carry out with normality the state functions (internal effectiveness) and being able to act and interact in the legal order on behalf the entity (external effectiveness)[13].

Nonetheless, if we take into account the practice of States we can perceive that effectivité is not as absolute as it may sound. The practice shows us that “the requirement of ‘government’ is less stringent than has been thought” and the right and exercise of the authority is important, not only his actual effectiveness[14].

2.4.Capacity To Enter Into Relations With Other States

This is the least useful of the four criteria used by the Montevideo Convention. As it has been expressed, this requirement is a consequence of the existence of an independent Government, because it only has the capacity to enter into relations with other states in case when there is an effective authority capable and able to interact in the international order[15].

2.5.Independence

Due to the insufficiencies and the criticisms poured over the Montevideo Convention, other authors have tried to evaluate other requirements which can be essential to the concept of statehood. Even though there are various, the most important and with more impact in the practice has been the criterion of independence[16].

For many, the independence of the State is the decisive factor[17], which means that the authority which is representing an entity can act and function independently “of that of any other State”[18]. While it is difficult to measure how much is a State independent, we could assert that would include “the exercise of substantial governmental authority with respect to some territory and people” and “the absence of subjection to the authority of another State or States”[19]. That is the reason behind the non-recognition of Manchukuo, because it was an artificial State, a ‘puppet-State’.

2.6.Consequences

Once an entity has acquired de facto the criteria explained above, independently by which way it was created, we can assert that it exists as a State. This does not signify that the entity will become part of the international legal order, as the practice has shown us. For it to be fully accepted it has to be created legally and/or to be recognized. That is why it is necessary to give a look to the concept of self-determination and the institution of recognition[20].

3. SELF-DETERMINATION

Due to the constant efforts throughout the United Nations of the countries borne from colonization, self-determination was converted in a legal principle, though in a narrow sense. If we combine the articles from the Charter[21] with GA Resolutions 1514[22], 1541[23], 2625[24], Article 2 of the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights[25], and the ICJ rulings in the Western Sahara[26] and East Timor[27] cases we can observe that the right of self-determination has been limited to those regions that were under the dominance of the Western countries[28].

In spite of that, there have been intentions on giving a broader sense to the legal notion, attempting to extend the right beyond decolonization. Some scholars have argued that behind the notion of self-determination any people can do it. In that sense, they talk about a double dimension of the idea: internal and external self-determination, which allows it in extreme circumstances to separate from a State, the so-called “remedial secession”[29]. Unfortunately, the practice of the States and the current state of the law demonstrates us that there is not yet such a broad self-determination; it has remained in the decolonization sphere, which means that beyond that sphere there is no right to self-determination, that is, to secede.

Said that, we need to stress that there is no rule in International Law which prohibits secession per se[30] - which is quite different to not having a right -, but the rules discourage such actions. The uti possidetis and the respect to the territorial integrity principles remain strong[31]. The success of an entity in seceding from the parent State is based on being recognized by other States. For that reason, we need to look at that institution.

4. RECOGNITION

Recognition is the action by which States consider that an entity has met all the requirements of statehood and has recognized it as such, and it is by his nature an act of political discretion. There are two main strands: the constitutive theory, which says that a State becomes one only until other States do so (status-creating) and the declaratory theory, which asserts that a State is one if it meets all the requirements (status-confirming)[32]. Both theories have proved wrong, as “life proves to be stronger than doctrine”[33]. At the moment we could say that recognition has a powerful effectiveness effect: maybe an entity can be a State, but if the other States do not recognized it, such an entity will not be able to function with efficacy in the international realm, despite being a State.

As Carrillo Salcedo pointed out, the institution of recognition has a powerful leverage. If many States recognize an entity as a State, that reinforces the political and juridical reality of it; “in other words, the recognition by the other States is not a necessary condition for the existence of the new State, but it does consolidate its international subjectivity and its insertion in the international community, even to those States who have not recognized it”[34]. That signifies that the approach of the States has been as a “peer-review” process, in the sense that they are the only ones who admit if the new candidate can enter the club[35].

Kosovo is a useful example: according to what we have seen, the secession of the country was illegal because it did not have the right to self-determination. However, the way it was recognized gave it the legitimacy it lacked legally.

5. CASE STUDY

According to what we have explained we could argue that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia have a right to self-determination or to secede from Georgia. However, that does not impede that they could not become States if they meet the criteria listed above. Both entities have a permanent population, a defined territory and even governments enough strong for maintaining the order. Moreover, both regions have been de facto independent from Georgia since the 1990s.

Nevertheless, they failed in the most important criterion: independence. As has been widely reported, both regions have been under the presence of Russian forces even before the outbreak of last summer[36], and they have Russian passports apart from economic aid they receive[37]. What is more evident of a lack independence is the fact that Abkhazia requested the Russians to represent its interests abroad[38] and South Ossetia wants to unify with North Ossetia and does not mind being part of Russia if that is the case[39]. All those facts are very clarifying: they cannot act and function independently from other State. Despite the fact that both entities “seeks to separate itself from the State to which it belongs” they do not seek to “create a new State”[40] up to the moment. Even recognition will not be enough, because there have been few who do recognize them and they do not have enough force to overcome the illegality of the situation and does not help to enter into relations with other States.

Even though every situation has its particular traits, there is a situation similar to this: the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is true that the events that led to the Cyprus conflict differ from the once that occurred this summer, but the outcome was similar. The Republic has survived due to the support and protection of Turkey, as it looks like in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Bangladesh could be also helpful in this case. We could argue that the help from Russia, like the Indian one in the 1970s, has been crucial to definitely separate the two regions from Georgia, which was trying to regain the control there.

6. CONCLUSION

After reviewing and evaluating the requirements that an entity needs to be qualified as a State, we can assert that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia can be considered such. However, politics can always surprise.

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[1] B. Vukas, ‘States, Peoples and Minorities’, 231 RCADI 263, at 280 (1991-VI); M. Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público 273 (2007); and J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law 31 (2006). For some definitions see T.D. Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents’, 37 CJTL 403, at 409-410 (1999).

[2] See Crawford, supra note 1, at 40.

[3] Id., at 45.

[4] B. Vukas, supra note 1, at 281 and M. Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of ‘Somaliland’ – The Resurrection of Somaliland Against All International ‘Odds’: State Collapse, Secession, Non-Recognition and Human Rights, at 12, n.29 (2004).

[5] J. Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law’, 48 BYIL 93, at 111 (1976-1977).

[6] Diez de Velasco, supra note 1, at 274.

[7] Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 13.

[8] Diez de Velasco, supra note 1, at 274.

[9] North Sea Continental Shelf, (Germany v. Denmark/ Netherlands), Judgement, 20 February, 1969 ICJ Rep. 3, at 32, par. 46.

[10] Crawford, supra note 1, at 55-56.

[11] Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 16 October, 1975 ICJ Rep. 3, at 43, par. 63.

[12] H. Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law 28 (1947).

[13] Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 14-15; Vukas, supra note 1, at 288 et seq.

[14] Crawford, supra note 1, at 57. It is also interesting to observe that there were cases where the effectiveness of an authority was insufficient to back the statehood, see I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 71 (2006).

[15] See Crawford, supra note 1, at 61; Crawford, supra note 4, at 119; Brownlie, supra note 14, at 71; Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 17.

[16] See Grant, supra note 1, at 438 et seq.

[17] See Brownlie, supra note 14, at 71, note 16 and Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 17, n.60.

[18] Lauterpacht, supra note 12, at 26.

[19] Crawford, supra note 1, at 66.

[20] For a thorough account of the relationship between legality and statehood see Crawford, supra note 1, 97ss. See also D. Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination 153 (2002).

[21] Art. 1.2, 55, 73, and 76.b.

[22] UN Doc. A/RES/1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

[23] UN Doc. A/RES/1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960.

[24] UN Doc. A/RES/2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970.

[25] UN Doc. A/RES/2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966.

[26] Supra note 11.

[27] East Timor, (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, 30 June, 1995 ICJ Rep. 2, at 102, par. 29.

[28] See D. F. Orentlicher, ‘Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims’, 23 Yale Journal of International Law 1, at 42 (1998); Schoiswohl, supra note 4, at 77-78; see also J. Crawford, ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Secession’, 69 BYIL 85, at 113 (1998); and A. Cassese, Self-Determination of People: a legal reappraisal 33 et seq. and 92 et seq (1995).

[29] See C. Tomuschat, ‘Secession and self-determination’, in M.G. Kohen (Ed.), Secession: International Law Perspectives, 23 at 38 (2006).

[30] Id., at 31 and J. Dugard and D. Raic, ‘The role of recognition in the law and practice of secession’, in Kohen, supra note 22, 94 at 102.

[31] See M. N. Shaw, ‘The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’, 67 BYIL 75 (1996); see also Crawford, supra note 21, at 85 et seq.

[32] S. Talmon, ‘The Constitutive versus the Declaratory Theory of Recognition: Tertium non Datur?’, 75 BYIL 101, at 101 (2004).

[33] N. Schrijver, ‘Can the Cause of Human Rights Justify Breaking Up a State? Reflections on Secession and the Ban on the Use of Force’, in K. Arts & P. Mihyo (Eds.), Responding to the Human Rights Deficit – Essays in Honour of Bas de Gaay Fortman, 49 at 51 (2003); Also I. Brownlie, ‘Recognition in Theory and Practice’, 53 BYIL 197 (1983).

[34] J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, Curso de derecho internacional público: introducción a su estructura, dinámica y funciones 47 (1991). (Translation by us)

[35] O.Ch. Okafor, Re-Defining Legitimate Statehood – International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa 55 (2000).

[36] ‘From frozen to boiling’, The Economist, 17 April 2008, (http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11043570) (Last seen 21 Sept.)

[37] ‘If Kosovo goes free’, The Economist, 29 November 2007, (httphttp://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10225052) (Last seen 21 Sept.)

[38] T. Halpin, ‘Kremlin announces that South Ossetia will join ‘one united Russia state’, The Times, 30 August 2008, (http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article4635843.ece) (Last seen 21 Sept.)

[39] See supra note 37.

[40] See Crawford, supra note 24, at 85.

unas pinceladas sobre el conflicto colombiano

Normalmente, Iñigo Sáenz de Ugarte - atendiendo a su blog únicamente - es una persona razonable y sensata, esto es, no se deja llevar por las simplificaciones y ofrece perspectivas nada prejuiciosas. Sin embargo, eso no impide que de vez en cuando, como a todos por otra parte, se deje llevar por la marea y nos ofrezca declaraciones un poco altisonantes.

Así, desde que empezó a trabajar y escribir regularmente para el periódico Público ha sido - y sigue siendo - uno de los baluartes más importantes. Pero parece ser que se esta dejando influenciar por cierto maniqueismo que subyace en el rotativo. La columna que ha escrito hoy sobre el sempiterno conflicto colombiano adolece, en mi opinión, de consistencia en algunos aspectos. Veámos primero el contenido de su columna y los párrafos más relevantes:

"Después de meses de gestiones discretas alentadas desde distintos puntos, Chávez ha acabado topándose con el mismo muro con el que se han chocado antes decenas de mediadores. (...) Ningún dirigente latinoamericano dormiría muy tranquilo si supiera que Chávez - revolucionario y protagonista de un golpe frustado en 1992 - está en contacto con sus militares. (...) El error [haber llamado al general colombiano Mario Montoya en vez de su a homólogo Uribe] - si se ha producido en los términos descritos por los colombianos - ha sido la excusa perfecta para que Uribe se deshaga de una mediación que se acercaba al momento de la verdad. ¿Era ése el momento que Uribe esperaba que nunca llegaría?. Las FARC no estaban por la labor de permitir un simple intercambio de cautivos. Querían liberar a los suyos, pero sobre todo buscaban legitimidad. Como en el anterior proceso de paz, exigían que el Ejército se retirara de dos zonas que serían ocupadas por ellos durante las negociaciones. Precisamente lo que Uribe no está dispuesto a permitir. En América Latina a casi todos los dirigentes les gusta ir de tipos duros." (negritas mías)

Lo que da a entender la opinión es que Uribe ha hecho mal en cortar y finiquitar las negociaciones que Chávez estaba realizando porque simplemente el Presidente colombiano no quiere en realidad negociar y que quiere demostrar su dureza impidiendo cualquier acuerdo o resultado de las negociaciones con las FARC.

Aunque puede ser cierto, y atendiendo a las acciones llevadas a cabo por Uribe, Iñigo pone de relieve parte de la problemática colombiana. Sin embargo, en esta circunstancia me parece que es razonable lo realizado por el Presidente colombiano.

En esta ocasión Chávez ha incumplido lo que le advirtieron que no hiciera. Con la llamada al general saltándose la linea de mando quebró la confianza que podía tener Uribe en el venezolano. Si se le marca su ámbito de actuación y en vez de atenerse a ello lo rompe, el colombiano está, por tanto, en su derecho de no continuar con las negociaciones. En este tipo de actividades la confianza es un elemento primordial, más si hablamos de alguien como Chávez, charlatán y con problemas de autoestima. Si en una negociación el representante incumple el acuerdo establecido con el representado, este último tiene la potestad de romperlo y de no obligarse por lo acordado. En este caso más que nunca.

Aparte, el artículo señala la legitimidad y que en el conlficto colombiano, del que reconozco que se poco, es una circunstancia muy relevante para el derecho internacional. En el ámbito supranacional sólo hay una serie de actores que son reconocidos como sujeto de derecho internacional. Los sujetos clásicos son los Estados y con el advenimiento del nuevo orden mundial establecido tras la 2ª Guerra Mundial provocó la aparición y aceptación definitiva de un nuevo actor: las Organizaciones Internacionales. Aparte de ambos, a diferencia de las relaciones internacionales, son escasas las figuras que son reconocidas completamente o parcialmente por el derecho internacional, su aceptación en el ordenamiento jurídico internacional supone consecuencias relevantes puesto que significa la ostentación de derechos y responsabilidades.

Un mecanismo clásico es el reconocimiento. Mientras que para el reconocimiento de Estados por parte de otros Estados es un acto declarativo, puesto que la existencia de facto del país es innegable, y por mucho que haya países que se opongan o no admitan la existencia no afecta a la vida del Estado, no es una declaración constitutiva, y por tanto, las únicas consecuencias que se derivan es la no concesión, por parte de los países que se niegan a reconocer, del establecimiento de relaciones recíprocas en el trato.

Adempero, para los grupos insurgentes las consecuencias de ser reconocidas y legitimadas son importantes. El caso más ejemplar es el colombiano, pues nos encontramos con la existencia de dos gobiernos que controlan dos partes distintas y diferenciadas del territorio del Estado. En este caso si algún gobierno reconoce a las FARC, esto es le otorga cierta capacidad jurídica internacional, da lugar a la concensión de ciertos derechos y responsabilidades. Esto puede ser perjudicial para el gobierno colombiano, de ahí su crítica a cualquier acto que pueda reforzar y dar legitimad a la guerrilla.

No obstante, el derecho internacional mantiene la asimetría entre ambos gobiernos y favorece al mantenimiento del gobierno que ha sufrido la insurrección con ciertas soluciones jurídicas. Si las autoridades del Estado no reconocen la situación, no se aplican las leyes de guerras previstas para las supuestos de conflictos de carácter no internacional, aplicándose las disposiciones del Derecho Penal interno.

La entrada sin duda no va a resolver nada, mi desconocimiento en general, más allá de lo que uno haya leido en libros o medios de comunicación, de la situación y la complejidad del mismo ha dado lugar a una irregularidad manifiesta de los comentarios y argumentos expuestos.

Perdonen las imprecisiones, todo comentario que me corrija y mejore el texto será bienvenido.